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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTMI 
LEONARD BATES, 
Pla;n.tiff o.;n.d Appellant, 
-vs.-
ODELL WALKER BURNS, and ODELL 
WALKER BURNS, FARRELL BURNS, 
and F'RANK D. BURN'S, doing business 
as a copartnership in the name and style 
of BURNS FEED AND SUPPLY COM-
PANY, 
Defend(JJfl)tS and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8207 
BRIEF ·OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPOND·E,NTS 
NATURE OF T'HE CASE 
This appeal arises out of an automobile accident 
which occurred on October 9, 1952, at the intersection of 
U. S. Highway 91, a through highway, and Utah Highway 
114, also known as the Geneva Road and Third West 
Street, in Pleasant Grove, Utah. Plaintiff had been 
traveling in a generally north direction along U. S. High-
way 114 and was driving a pick-up truck through the in-
tersection to proceed north on Third West in Pleasant 
Grove, Utah, when his pick-up truck wa'S struck by a coal 
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truck driven by the defendants, which had been traveling 
west upon U. S. Highway 91, towards Salt Lake City, 
Utah. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, defend-
ants moved for a directed verdict. The court reserved its 
judgment and submittHd tlie case to the jury, who re-
turned a verdict itemized as follows: 
Physical injury, pain and suffering ________ $ 
Medical Exp·enses --------------------------------------$ 214.50 
Loss of earnings during recupera.tion ____ $1,000.00 
·Permanent disability __________________________________ $4, 000.00 
Pick-up truck ----------------------------------------------$ 565.00 
Total ----------------------------- ____ -------------------$5,779 .'50 
(R.171) 
Thereafter, the court, p·ursuant to defendants' mo-
tion, set aside the verdict and entered a judgment of no 
cause of action in favor of the defendants (R. 237-8) on 
the grounds that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence 
which proximately contributed to cause the collision as a 
matter of law. 
The questions presented by this appeal are two-fold: 
Whether the evidence sustains the court's finding that 
the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which was a contri-
buting cause of the accident and his resulting injuries, 
and, in the event the court should see fit to reinstate the 
verdict, should it be reinstated in view of the fact that 
it is erroneous, the verdict being invalid and there 
being no evidence or findings to sustain ·damages for loss 
of earnings or permanent disability~ 
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ST·ATEMENT OF FACTS 
The intersection where this accident occurred is 
located south of Pleasant Grove in Utah County. It is 
forrned by the crossing of U. S. Highway 91, which at 
this point runs generally east and west, and a highway 
extending generally north and south designated as High-
way 114, or the Geneva Road south of the intersection 
and Third West Street north of the intersection (S.ee 
Exhibit A). 
U. 8. Highway 91 is the preferred highway. There 
are stop signs located on the northwest and southwest 
corners of the intersection, so that cars entering the inter-
section from the Geneva R.oad or Third West Street are 
obliged to stop before entering (Exhibit A). 
Plaintiff was thoroughly conversant with the inter-
seetion having made the same trip six days a week for 
some time (R. 59). He testified that at times the 
traffic along U. S. Highway 91 was very heavy. There is 
evidence he had been required to wait as long as fifteen 
minutes before entering and crossing the intersection. 
On the day of the accident at about two o'clock P.M., 
the plaintiff, a man sixty-nine years of age (R. 83), was 
driving his pickup north on the Geneva Road (R. 58-59) 
on his way to the Jacob Fieed Mills of Pleasant Grove, 
Utah, to get a load of feed for turkeys that he was raising. 
The weather was clear and the pavement dry. He testi-
fied that as he reached the intersection he stopped at the 
stop sign, remaining stopped for four or five minutes as 
the traffic on Highway 91 was heavy. Then he started 
across the intersection (R. 61) at a speed of five to six 
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miles p·er hour ( R. 62) . He testified on direct exalnina-
tion that he did not see defendants' truck until it was 
"maybe 150 feet" away and speeded his pick-up truck up 
a little "on the last end" to get through the intersection. 
(R. 62) On cross-examination, the plaintiff estimated 
that he was past the center of Highway 91 (R. 89) when 
he first saw the defendants' coal truck 100 to 150 feet 
away (R. 90). l-Ie denied ever making the statement (See 
Defendants'Exhibit 1): "I did not see the truck or know 
it was near until it hit me," although he admits that he 
signed the statement (R. 93). He admitted that he may 
have forgotten that he did not see the truck at all. (R.90) 
The p·oint of impact was approximately 12·5 feet from the 
stop sign where the plaintiff had stopped (Exhibit A). A 
line drawn on Exhibit from the point where the stop sign 
was located would indicate a vehicle approaching the inter-
section from the south would have been visible when 368 
feet from the intersection, provided that trees and foli-
age on the south west corner of the intersection did not 
obstruct the line of visibility. 
·The plaintiff did not recall seeing Dr. Paul V. Chris-
topherson, whom he knew, drive a car east toward the 
intersection and turn south onto the Geneva Road while 
plaintiff was stopped at the stop· sign (R. 88). Paul V. 
Christopherson testified that he was personally acquaint-
ed with the plaintiff (R .. 103). Immediately prior to 
the accident he had been traveling east on U. S. Highway 
91 ·(R. 104). As he reached the intersection, he made a 
a right hand turn onto Geneva Road (R. 104). As the 
witness passed the plaintiff's truck, which was then 
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stopped in the vicinity of the stop sign, he nodded to the 
plaintiff, who did not return his salutation (R.. 105). 
Plaintiff was looking to the west out of the window at 
the time he was observed by the witness. As the witness 
drove past him, the plaintiff started his pick-up truck 
through the intersection. Apparently Dr. Chrisopherson 
beca1ne apprehensive by reason of the inattention of the 
plaintiff to traffic upon U. S. Highway 91, and watched 
him in the rear view mirror as plaintiff proceeded into 
the intersection (R. 106). He testified that he saw the 
plaintiff's truck start through the intersection and pro-
ceed to a point about 6 to 10 feet north of the center 
line where the collision occurred (R. 107). After the 
collision, the witness returned to the scene of the acci-
dent. From his observations both before and after the 
collision, the witness expressed the opinion that the 
defendants' coal truck was not traveling fast (R. 114). 
La Var Holdaway, plaintiff's witness, testified that he 
was stopped at the stop sign at the northwest corner 
of the intersection waiting for the coal truck to pass 
at the time of the collision (R. 23). He saw plaintiff's 
pick-up truck stopped across U. S. Highway 91 (R. 23). 
He watched the pick-up move forward into the inter-
section ( R. 23). As plaintiff proceeded through the 
intersection, he did not change his rrute of travel, stop, or 
turn his vehicle at any time before the collision (R. 29-31). 
It appeared to the witness that plaintiff did not see the 
coal truck ( R. 29) . 
La Var Holdaway testified further that he observed 
the coal truck approaching at a normal rate of speed, 
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at one time estimating the speed at 40 to 50 1niles per 
hour and at another at 40. The plaintiff crossed in front 
of the coal truck when it was 50 to 75 feet from the plain-
tiff's pickup (R. 30). The driver of the coal truck applied 
the brakes and swerved toward the witness's car, almost 
striking the front of the witness's car, in an effort to 
avoid the collision (R. 30-31). 
lone Garbin testified that she lived on the north-
wesrt corner of the intersection (R. 130). At the time of 
the collision, she was standing in her kitchen door calling 
her daughter and two grandchildren for lunch. F'rom 
where she was standing she had a clear view of the inter-
section and first observed the plaintiff's pick-up truck 
a.s it started across the high,vay (R. 131). The pick-up 
p~roceeded very slowly across the intersection and neir.ther 
stopped or turned or otherwise attempted to avoid the 
collision (R .. 132). She also observed the coal truck and 
saw the driver of that truck attempt to avoid the pick-up 
and still not strike a car which was stopped at the stop 
sign on the north side of the highway (R. 132). The wit-
ness testified 1that since the accident, the southwest 
corner of the intersection has been re-graded and the 
weeds on that corner removed to give drivers a hetter 
view of approaching traffic (R. 133). 
Mack Ostergaard testified that on October 9, 1952, 
he was employed as a police officer for Linden City and 
was called 'to the scene of this accident (R. 115). Upon 
arriving at the scene, he first went to the plaintiff to see 
if he could he of any assistance. Mr. Bates told him, 
"I don't know what hit me." Odell Burns, driver of 
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defendants' coal truck, told him, "I didn't have a chance. 
He pulled right in fronrt of me." Mr. Burns estimated 
his speed at 35 miles per hour just before the accident, 
and said that he had tried to drive between the two cars, 
the pick-up and the car parked on the north side of the 
intersection, and had 'tried to avoid hitting either of 
them (R. 117). 
The police officer testified that since the accident 
the area on the southwest corner of the intersection has 
been graded to give better visibilirty of approaching 
traffic (R. 118). The witness located the point of impact 
by the debris on the highway as being on the north side of 
U. S. Highway 91 and in the normal lane of traffic for 
cars traveling north on Third West Street. He placed 
an "(X)" on. Exhibit A where he belived the point of 
impact to be (R. 119). From this point there were skid 
marks extending back up Highway 91 for a distance of 
22 feet, presun1ably laid down by the coal truck. 
Odell Burns, the driver of the defendanfts' coal 
truck and one of the defendants herein, testified he was 
traveling west on U. s .. Highway 91 at. a. speed of 35 miles 
per hour (R. 138-140). When he was within approx-
imately 100 feet of the intersection, he saw the pick-up 
truck start across the highway from the south going 
north (R. 169). He expected the pick-up to stop, but 
honked his horn and turned slightly to the right. The 
pick-up kept coming north without changing its speed, 
turning or in any way changing its course. When it 
became apparent that it was not going to yield the right 
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of way, he applied the brakes and turned his truck to 
the right (R. 139). 
Mr. John Stewart, testified that he took the state-
ment, defendant's. Exhibit 1, wherein the defendant said 
that he did not see the truck or knew it was near until it 
hit him. ·The statement was taken in the presence of Mrs. 
Bates and was read by Mr. Bates before he signed it . .P_i_t 
the time Mr.Stewart went out to s-ee Mr. Bates, Mr. ·stew-
art testified that he had no connection with either Mr. 
Bates or the counsel for the defendant. Testifying out of 
the presence of the jury, Mr. Stewart testified that he wa;s 
employed by the Farmers Insurance Company at the 
time. When the statement was taken he did not recall 
whether or not Mr. Bates was insured with his company 
but that his employer did not have any business con-
nection, relationship or connection of any kind with the 
Burns Feed Company, the partners in that company or 
the attorneys for the defendants. 
On the question of the injuries sustained, the only 
evidence presented was the testimony of the plaintiff, 
his wife, and his daughter and a stipulation between 
the parties. They testified that the plaintiff had received 
a cut on his head two and a half inches long ·(R. 35-68), 
a lump on his forehead, and his right eye was swollen, 
his knees were cut, and he had a sprained shoulder 
(R. 27). It was stipulated rthat the plaintiff received 
seven simple fractures of the ribs, and at the time of the 
trial, the ribs had fully healed. No X-rays were pro-
duced. There was no medical testimony that plaintiff 
sustained any permanent disability. The only evidence 
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was that he was that he \vas forgetful (R. 39-53), and 
that he cannot do the work now that he could do before 
the accident (R. 40-54). He admitted that he had not 
done heavy work before rthe accident. 
Plaintiff clain1ed to have lost a number of turkeys in 
the year 195·2 as a result of this accident. An examina-
tion of his testimony which appears in the record start-
ing on page 75 will show that the evidence in this regard 
is extremely speculative. Mr. Bates testified: 
"Q. Now, your wife testified that you raised 
quite a number of turkeys in 1952. How 
many~ 
A. Well, I got 6,000 to start in with, but I 
lost, oh-I marketed about 5,200. 
Q. 5,200. That would be a loss of about 800. 
A. Yes, sir-800. 
MR. HANSON: 800. 
11:R. STEW ART: Pardon me. Now, in con-
nection with your loss of turkeys, do you 
know approximately how many of these 'Nere 
lost after October 2, 1952 ~ 
A. No, I couldn't tell you. 
Q. I-I ave you some idea~ 
A. No, I haven't any idea. 
* * * 
MR. STEWART: Were any of the turkeys 
in 1952 lost after October 9th of that year~ 
A. Oh, yes. Well, after O·ctober 9th, there 
were several lost between then and the time 
I marketed them, on the 1st of December. 
Q. Would you have any idea approximately 
how many were loS't ~ 
* * * 
A. Well, I should judge-you take later in the 
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season, when your turkeys is about ready 
for market, why you lose a few more than 
you do earlier. I should judge maybe I 
lost 200. 
Q. Now was. the loss, a higher loss than ordin-
arily for that season of the year~ 
* * * 
A. It all depends on the season. Now we had 
quite a lot of storm in ·October of 19'52, and 
November, and when the turkeys get heavy, 
that is when you have quite a loss. 
* * * 
Q. Now as a result of your accident, can you 
trace any of your losses to the fact that you 
were incapable of looking after your turkeys 
that year~ 
A. Well, I wasn't able-as a general rule, I go 
through my turkeys twice and three times a 
day, and I watch them pretty close, and I 
wasn't able to do it. 
* * * 
Q. What p~art of 1hat loss would you sayY 
* * * 
A. I should judge I lost about thirty-five per 
cent more. 
Q. Thirty-five per cent more Y 
* * * 
MR. STEW ART: What did you receive for 
your turkeys that year~ 
A. I got thirty-eight cents a pound, that was for 
A's. Then the B's was three cents below that, 
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Q. Now can you tell us of the 200 that you lost, 
about what percentage were A's and what 
were B's~ 
A. I couldn't tell you that. 
Q. You haven't any way to arrive at that~ 
A. Most of your turkeys, if your h-erd is in good 
shape, they are pret' near all A ~turkeys. 
·They will run about, around, oh pretty close 
to eighty per cent, between seventy-five and 
eighty per cent. 
Q. That is of your herd~ 
A. Herd. 
Q. Now, of the 200, would there be some way to 
guess at that, or estimate it~ 
* * * 
A. Well I should judge that there was, out of 
that 200, there was anyway 150 of them A 
turkeys. 
* * * 
Q. That would leave you 50 turkeys~ 
A. That would leave 50 turkeys for B's and 
C's. 
Q. Now, I'm trying to get at the 70 that you 
lost, or thereabouts, as a result of your not 
being able to be on the job. 
MR. HANS:ON: We object to that as lead-
ing and suggestive, and repetitious, Your 
Honor, he testified about the storms. 
Apparently the man doesn't know. And 
counsel keeps asking him the same question. 
We object to it as repetitious." 
Mr. Bates testified further in this regard that he 
11 
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had to hire additional help to raise his turkeys in 
1953 because of his injuries. In the year 1952, he stated 
lie made about $2,000.00 net, but that in 1953 he ran 
more turkeys grossing $58,038.67 and netting $8,212.35, 
It appeared that the plaintiff had made consider-
ably more from the operation of his turkeys after the 
accident than he had the yea.r before. 
In his brief, plaintiff has presented his argument in 
four points. ·The first three apear to be directed toward 
tli·e p-roposition that the evidence did not sustain the 
court's finding that plaintiff was guil5 of negligence as 
a matter .of law. The last point appears to be directed 
toward the entry of the verdict of the jury. We· will deal 
with the argument under the following statements of 
points: 
STATE,MENT OF POIN'T·S 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
AND THA'T HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE 
OF THE COLLISION. 
POINT II. 
THE VERDICT RETURNED BY THE JURY WAS IM-




THE EVIDEN·CE SUSTAINS THE FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
AND THAT HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE 
OF THE COLLISION. 
Much of the plaintiff's argument is dedicated to a 
12 
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discussion of whether the driver of the defendants' coal 
truck was negligent. Without conceding that the driver 
was negligent, we wish to point out that the verdict in this 
case was set aside on the grounds that the plain tiff "was 
negligent as a matter of lavv and, likewise, as a n1atter of 
law, his negligence proximately contributed to produce 
the accident and his own injury and damage." We will, 
therefore, confine our argument to a discussion of the 
plaintiff's own negligence. 
The assertion is made that in reviewing the court's 
action on this motion, v1e must review the evidence in its 
most favorable light to the plaintiff. We do not contro-
vert this proposition and will not, therefore, cite any 
authorities on this point. 
The evidence in this case is that the plaintiff was 
"\Vell acquainted with the intersection which was on occa-
sion very busy. Frequently, plaintiff had to wait a con-
siderable time for traffic to clear before entering the 
intersection. R.eference to Exhibit 1 will illustrate that 
the stop sign is located a considerable distance south of 
the intersection. At that point the plaintiff would have 
had a view of traffic approaching the intersection on the 
east for a distance of 368 feei, except that the foilage on 
the southeast corner of the intersection may have blocked 
his view. He testified that he looked both ways and he 
could not see but what the highway was clear. There is 
no evidence in the record tha:t he looked toward the east 
again, the direction from which the coal truck came, until 
after he had entered the intersection and crossed the 
center line of U. S. Highway 91. The witness Paul 
13 
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Christopherson, testified that plaintiff was looking west 
and continued to do so as he entered the intersection. 
Had plaintiff looked to the east, he would have probably 
seen the defendants' truck approaching, as La Var 
Holdaway did as it was only 100 feet from the inter-
section at that time. If this were the case, plaintiff would 
be guilty of negligence as a matter of law in entering 
the intersection. If the truck were not within his range of 
vision, which was somewhat greater than 368 feet, plain-
tiff had ample time to enter the intersection and drive 
through the same safely before the coal truck traveling 
from 35· to 50 miles per hour could have reached the 
intersection, that is, had he p·roceeded at a reasonable 
rate of speed. The evidence shows that he entered the 
~~:er:;;~:=i~t:t: ~~:" ~·;:~~ ~~ ~~~~:~·~~~~~d: 
speed of only 5 or 6 miles per hour. 
The witness, La Var Holdaway, who was stopped 
at the stop sign across the intersection testified that 
at the time the plaintiff entered the inte:csection the wit-
ness could see the coal truck and was waiting for this 
truck to pass. Plaintiff drove to the point of impact 
without either slowing or increasing his sp·eed or varying 
the course of his vehicle. It appeared to the witness and 
the conclusion is warranted that the plaintiff did not see 
the coal truck. The other eye witness, lone Garbin, testi-
fied the same. Th·e plaintiff himself told the investigating 
police officer that, "I don't kno'v wha:t hit me." Plaintiff 
~igned a statement to the effect, "I did not see the truck 
or know it was near until it hit me." 
14 
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It therefore appears from the evidence that the 
plaintiff drove through a busy intersection without look-
ing in the direction from whence came the car that struck 
him, either as he entered or proceeded through the inter-
section at the very slo'v speed of 5· to 6 miles per hour. 
This accident could have been avoided at any time by 
the plaintiff by one or more of the following actions. He 
could have looked for approaching traffic from the east 
before entering the intersection. Had he seen defen-
dants' coal truck approaching, the plaintiff need only 
have waited until the vehicle passed the intersection. 
Not seeing the coal truck, plaintiff would have had plenty 
of time to cross the intersection had he proceeded at a 
reasonable speed and not at a speed of only 5 to 6 miles 
per hour. As the plaintiff drove into the intersection, his 
range of vision naturally became greater than the 368 feet 
that he had at the stop sign. Had he been properly 
observant as he drove through ~the intersection, the coal 
truck would have been apparent to him at some point 
prior to the collision. In this event, plaintiff needed only 
to have slowed his vehicle slightly or increased his speed 
in order to have avoided the collision. ·Thus, it becomes 
apparent that his failure to look, or if he looked, his 
failure to see was a proximate cause of the collision. 
Plaintiff cites a number of cases purporting to sup-
port the proposition that the question of whether or not 
the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in this case was a 
jury question. In none of these cases was the negligence 
of the plaintiff or the causal relationship of that negli-
gence to the injury as clearly shown as in this case. The 
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collision in the case of Martin v Stevens, 243 Pac. ( 2d) 
7 47, ____ , __ Utah ______ , occurred at an open intersection in a 
residential area where neither driver was preferred to the 
other. Plaintiff in that case testified that he looked to 
the east when approximately 20 feet from the intersec-
tion and saw no car in the direction from whence the 
defendant came. The plaintiff proceeded into the inter-
section at a speed of 10 to 15 miles p·er hour where he 
was struck by a car which was exceeding the speed limit. 
In the case at hand, we have no evidence that the plain-
tiff looked as he entered the intersection. In fact, the 
evidence is to the contrary. He was entering a prefer-
red highway, and therefore had a higher degree of duty 
than that in the case above cited. Moreover, he drove 
through the intersection at a speed of only 5 to 6 miles 
per hour. 
Likewise, in the case of Poulson v MUIYI!Y/Jess, 241 Pac. 
(2d) 152, ______ Utah ______ , the evidence was that plaintiff 
looked in the direction from whence the defendant came 
and could not see a car within 400 feet of the intersection 
and was struck while crossing the intersection by a car 
which was approaching, not at a rate of 35 to 50 miles 
p·er hour as here, but at a rate of 70 miles per hour. 
In Lowder v. Holley, 233 Pac. (2d) 350, ______ Utah _____ _ 
plaintiff also testified that he looked before entering the 
intersection, hut could see no car within 40 rods of the 
intersection and was struck by a car traveling at an ex-
cessive rate of speed. 
The factual situation in Hardmam v. Thurman, 2·39 
Pac. ( 2d) 215, ______ Utah ______ , is not analagous to the factual 
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situation in this case. In that case, Mrs. Hardman was 
driving in a southerly direction on State Street in Salt 
Lake Ci·ty, Utah, intending to turn east on Twenty-First 
South Street. As the light turned green at Twenty-First 
South Street, she stopped 1nomentarily to permi·t north-
bound traffic to proceed. An oil tanker which was pro-
ceeding northward in the first lane east of the center of 
State Street stopped at the south line of the intersection 
signalling for a left-hand turn. A car in the second lane 
east of the center of State Street stopped as Mrs. Hard-
Inan started to ·turn east. Mrs. Hardman observed no 
cars in the third lane to the east of the center of the 
street, but as the Hardman car reached a point where it 
\vould have been crossing the third lane, a trailer truck 
operated by the defendant struck her automobile. The 
court found that in view of the street plan at the inter-
section, it was not unreasonable for Mrs. Hardman not to 
expect any through traffic on the third lane and she 
might well have been unable to see the defendant's 
vehicle because of the other cars which were stopped at 
the intersection. 
The case of Conklin v. Walsh, 193 Pac. (2d) 437, 113 
Utah 276, involved the duties of one traveling upon an 
arterial highway to observe traffic which might enter 
upon that highway from intersecting highways. In that 
case there was no question but that the driver of the car 
entering the arterial highwaywas guilty of negligence, the 
question being whether her negligence, she being the wife 
of the owner of the automobile she was driving, could be 
imputed to the owner. 
17 
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The case of Nielsen v. Mauchley, 202 Pac. (2d) 54-7, 
115 Utah 68, likewise deals with the duty of one traveling 
upon an arterial highway to observe other vehicles enter-
ing upon a highway, in that case from a driveway. 
The same problem was involved in Hess v. Robinson, 
163 Pac. ( 2d) 510, 109 Utah 60. 
In Martin v. St.evens, supra, the court discussed those 
cases in which the driver was held guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law: Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 
501, 98 Pac. ( 2d) 350; Sine v. S1alt Lake Trarnsportation 
Co., 106 Utah 289, 147 Pac. (2:d) 8715; Hickok v. Skinrner, 
113 Utah 1, 190 Pac. (2d) 514; Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 
276, 193 Pac. (2d) 437; and Gren v. Norton, (Utah) 213 
Pac. (2d) 356. Each of these cases was said to have one 
principle which distinguished it from the case of Martin 
v. ·stevens and the other cases cited by the plaintiff. 
"Each of them was decided upon a proposi-
tion that the circumstances were such that the 
driver held to be negligent as a matter of law, 
either observed, or in the exercise of due care 
should have observed, the manner in which the 
other driver was approaching the intersection, 
and in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable 
care have avoided the collision. Or to state it in 
other words, the negligence, or manner of driving 
of the other driver was such that th·e driver ap-
p·raising the situation was alerted to it, or by us-
ing due care would have been so alerted in time 
so that by the exercise of ordinary precaution 
he could have avoided the collision. And, in each 
of these cases this seemed to the court so clearly 
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In the case of Bullock v. Luke, supra, a motorcyclist 
approaching an intersection at a speed of 25 miles per 
hour, who failed to see a truck approaching the same 
intersection from his left until he was within 20 feet of 
the intersection, although his view was unobs~tructed for 
a distance of 200 feet when 60 feet from the intersection.~ 
was held to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
for failing to observe the truck sooner and for insisting 
on his right of way after it was apparent that the truck 
driver was not going to yield. The court said: 
"The question may arise: When should Bul-
lock have seen Luke to have avoided the character-
ization of being negligent~ In Blashfield, Vol. 
2, Perm. Ed. Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and 
Practice, page 230, Sec. 1038, this statement is 
found: "~ehere is no arbitrary rule as to the time 
and place of looking for vehicles on an intersecting 
road, and no particular distance from the inter-
section is prescribed for that purpose. The gen-
eral standards are tha:t observation should be 
made at the first opportunity and at a point where 
observation will be reasonably efficient for, and 
conduce to, protection.' 
"We do not have to determine any given 
point. It is sufficient if under all the circum-
stances we can properly say that Bullock's failure 
to see Luke was, as a matter of law, negligence. 
When we consider that the view west on First 
s.outh was unobstructed for a distance of 200 to 
800 feet, varying w~th a position from 20 to 60 feet 
south or the south intersection line of Third West, 
and that through all that distance, and even far-
ther Bullock failed to see Luke, we believe reason-
able' minds cannot differ as to negligence on the 
part of Bullock." 
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In Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co., supra, it 
was held: 
''It was the duty of taxi cab operator toward 
passenger on approaching intersection, to look in 
both directions along intersection, and not merely 
in direction from which vehicles having right of 
way over him might be approaching." 
And that: 
"If taxi cah operator, having right of way at 
intersection, saw, or in exercise of due care should 
have seen, another automobile approaching at an 
excessive· rate of speed or otherwise indicating 
that right of way was probably not going to be 
yielded to taxi cab op·erator, his duty toward pas-
senger required him to slow down, or sjtop or 
otherwise take appropriate measures to avert a 
collision." 
In the case of Hickok v. Skinner, supra, the collision 
occurred at Twenty-F'irst South Street and West Temple 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The plaintiff was traveling 
north on West Temple. Upon approaching the intersec-
tion, plaintiff came to a stop· at the stop sign located 20 
feet south of the south curbline of Twenty-First South 
Street. There was heavy traffic coming from the west, 
so he waited for these cars to pass. He then looked east 
and saw the automobile driven by the defendant more 
than half a block away, between 400 and 500 feet east of 
the intersection. When he started up, plaintiff figured he 
had time in which to make a safe crossing before the car 
coming from the east would reach the intersection. He 
never again looked to the east and was struck by a car 
corning from that direction when he was 18 feet south of 
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the north curbline of Twenty-First South Street and 65 
feet north of the stop sign at which he had stopped. The 
trial court found the plain tiff to have been guilty of con-
tributary negligence as a matter of law. The Supreme 
Court sustained the judgment and said: 
"* * * While the burden to drive so carefully 
as always to be prepared for, and to be able to 
avoid, the negligence of another should not be 
placed on either driver, there should be placed 
on both the burden to keep a proper lookout and 
to use reasonable care to avoid a collision. Neither 
should be permitted to close his eyes to other ve-
hicles which he knows or has reason to believe are 
approaching, simply because a state statute or 
municipal ordinance designates hirn the preferred 
driver. The rights of drivers approaching and 
crossing intersections are relative. Both drivers 
have the duties of being heedful and of maintain-
ing a proper lookout. Plaintiff was neglectful in 
both particulars, and no jury could reasonably 
find he was not negligent. 
"Plaintiff in claiming that, having looked once 
and having concluded that he had time to clear 
the intersection, he was not negligent in not having 
looked again, overlooks two factors that we be-
lieve are controlling influences in this case, and 
which effect the application of the rule of the Bul-
lock case mentioned above. The first is, he was 
uninformed as to the speed of defendant's car. 
The second is that the speed at which plaintiff 
was traveling and the distance which he had to 
travel, before he entered defendant's path of 
travel, permitted him to look and to re-appraise 
the relative positions of the cars and pern1itted 
him ample opportunity to correct his first conclu-
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sion, if he had erroneously estimated the distance 
the defendant's car was from the intersection." 
There is some question as to whether or not the 
Hickok case was overruled in the Martin v. Stevens case, 
supra. It may be that the court extended the doctrine too 
far under the particular facts in the Hickok case. In that 
case, plaintiff's negligence consisted in traveling 65· feet 
into the intersection without ever looking to the east after 
having observed an automobile approaching from that 
.direction a sufficient distance away ·that the plaintiff 
felt he had time to get through the intersection. 
However, in the case at hand, the facts show a much 
clearer picture of contributory. negligence. In this case 
there is no evidence that the plaintiff looked in the di-
rection from which the defendant came, either as he drove 
the 12·5 feet into the interseetion and to the point of im-
pact at the slow speed of 5 or 6 miles per hour or as he 
entered the intersection. At least, not until it was too 
late to avoid the collision. 
As we have stated, the case of Conklin v. Walsh, 
supra, is concerned mainly with the duty of a driver on 
an arterial highway to observe a disfavored driver on an 
intersecting street. 
The facts in the last case, Gren v. Norton, supra, are 
very similar to this case. The collision occurred at the 
intersection of Fif~th West and Twelfth North Streets in 
Provo, Utah. Fifth West is an arterial highway running 
north and south. Traffic on Twelfth North Street is con-
trolled by stop signs on the east and west sides of the in-
tersection. From the intersection to the north, Fifth 
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\Vest Street continues on the level for approximately 
2,265 feet and then rises gradually before again leveling 
out to a point approximately one mile north of the inter-
section. 
The defendant was driving a truck south along Fifth 
West Street toward the intersection. At the same time, 
the decedent approached the intersection from the east 
along Tvvelfth North Street. The defendant driver testi-
fied he first saw decedent's automobile as it was moving 
between the stop sign and the east edge of a concrete 
safety zone in the center of the intersection. At that time 
the defendant was approximately 250 feet north of the 
intersection. He tested his air brakes and sounded his 
horn and expected the deceased to stop in the safety zone 
in the center of the intersection and wait until his truck 
had cleared. The decedent's car proceeded along the in-
tersection in a straight westerly direction at a constant 
rate of speed which he estimated to he between 5 and 10 
miles per hour. When the defendant was about 100 
feet north of the intersection, he decided that the 
deceased was not going to stop and he immediately set his 
brakes and sounded his horn to the point of i1npact. The 
defendant testified that the deceased drove his automo-
bile slumped down in his seat and his head straight for-
ward and until just before the point of i1upact. That 
when the deceased was about 10 feet east of the point of 
collision, he appeared to look up and try to turn his auto-
roo bile to the left to a void a collision. 
Two eye witnesses, not parties to the action, testified 
decedent's car proceeded into and across the intersection 
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at a slow, constant rate of sp·eed. Both observed the de-
ceased slumped down in the seat of the car with his head 
straight forward. 
All witnesses to the accident or to the movement of 
deceased's car immediately prior thereto, testified the 
car continued across the intersection at a slow and con-
stant rate of speed without any ap·preciable change in 
speed or direction until just before the ilnpact. While 
the estimated speeds varied, all witnesses described the 
movements of the car as relatively slow and all were im-
p-ressed with the apparent lack of action on the part of 
the deceased as the cars ap·proached each other. 
The distance from the stop sign where the deceased 
had stopped on Twelfth North Street to the point of im-
pact was 108 feet. 
The fourth District Court had entered a judgment 
for the plaintiff. The Sup·reme Court held the plaintiff's 
decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
and reversed the judgment. The court said: 
"It is undisputed in this case that as de-
ceased entered the intersection he had an unob-
structed view of Fifth West Street to the north 
for about one mile. Under the rules announced 
in the cases pTeviously mentioned, he is charged 
with being aware of the approach of defendant's 
large trailer truck. In traversing the intersection 
deceased was traveling slightly to the north of 
west and by merely glancing to his right, he could 
have seen all traffic which wa:s within one-half 
mile of the intersection coming south on Fifth 
West Street. Undoubtedly, at the time he stopped 
at the stop· sign defendant's truck was some con-
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siderable distance north of the highvvay and de-
ceased could then have reasonably concluded that 
it was not close enough to constitute an immediate 
hazard. His negligence, if any, was not in starting 
into the intersection. If he can be charged with 
negligence, as a n1atter of law, it is because of his 
failure to look for approaching traffic or observe 
defendant's truck after he entered into and upon 
the main traveled portions of the highway and be-
fore he started across the west portion. He had 
ample tin1e to make observations to the north. It is 
son1e 108 feet from the place where deceased stop-
ped to the place where the collision occurred. If 
we accept the testimony most favorable to the de-· 
ceased, defendant's truck was traveling at a speed 
of bet\veen 50 and 55 miles per hour. This would 
have figured approximately 80 feet per second, 
so that it would require approximately 25 seconds 
for the truck to travel the 2,200 feet which, accord-
ing to the testimony is relatively level. There is 
no reason why, during this whole period, the truck 
could not have been observed by the deceased had 
he been keeping any lookout. 
"There is some contention made that the jury 
could have concluded that deceased saw the ap-
proach of defendant's truck, concluded he had the 
right of way and estimated that he could clear the 
crossing p·rior to the time the defendant reached 
the intersection, and that such estimate vvould only 
; ,~~ an error in judgment and would not charge the 
deceased with being guilty of negligence as a mat-
ter of law. It is further con tended in this connec-
tion that deceased is entitled to a presurnption that 
he used due care for his own safety and that due 
care presumes that he saw the approach of the 
truck and concluded that he could pass through the 
intersection in safety. These contentions might 
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bear merit if the facts did not establish contrary 
conclusions. The deceased had approximately 88 
feet to travel fron1 the stop sign until he reached 
the place where his movement might be imperiled 
by traffic proceeding south along the west side 
of the highway. After reaching this safety area 
he would no longer be concerned with the move-
ment of any vehicles traveling north and so he 
could concentrate his attention on the movement 
of traffic to the south. As he passed between 
the lanes of northbound and southbound traffic, 
he had app·roximately 22 feet of safe space and at 
the sp·eed he was traveling he was afforded a rea-
sonable opportunity to make observation to the 
north. There was no other traffic with which h~ 
need concern hin1self. His actions, as testified to 
by the witnesses, seemed to indicate that he had 
abandoned all precautions for his own safety. He 
could not have made an estimate of the distance 
the defendant was from the intersection when de-
ceased attempted to pass from the safety zone 
in to the traffic lane on the west, as to the size of 
the truck, its immediate proximity to the inter-
section, and the noise of the horn, which witnesses 
claim was operating, all argue strongly against the 
p·ossibility of the deceased concluding he could 
pass over the west lane ahead of the truck. More-
over, unless deceased was oblivious to the ap-
proach of the truck, he would not have remained 
immobile and motionless and would have taken 
some action to avoid the collision. It is inconceiv-
able that a person would see a fast-moving truck 
coming down a highway, estimate he could clear 
ahead of the vehicle, and yet fail to further ob-
serve its movements, fail to reapp-raise the situa-
tion, fail to increase or decrease the sp·eed of his 
car or change his course of travel, or take any ac-
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tion to avoid the collision until 10 feet away from 
a point of impact, particularly when there was no 
necessity of observing the movement of other ve-
hicles, when there was no obstruction of vision, 
when visibility was good and when the horn of the 
truck was blo,ving for at least 100 feet and the 
tires were dragging for 55 feet. The physical evi-
dence and deceased's acts and conduct were such 
that any presumption of due care had been de-
stroyed. One look to the north at any time after 
deceased cleared the east lanes would have ap-
praised a reasonably careful driver that the move-
ment across the west lanes could not be made in 
safety." 
We agree \vith the statement in the opinion of Martin 
v. Stevens, supra: 
"No matter how far afield one may go in re-
viewing, analyzing and rationalizing the decisions 
in these intersection cases, he 1nust always con1e 
back to the one basic concept 'v hich under lies and 
controls the law of torts: The conduct of the my-
thical but extremely useful 'ordinary reasonable 
prudent man under the circumstances', all of which 
is encompassed in the shorter phrase, 'due care'." 
We feel that under the peculiar circumstances of 
this case; that is, that the plaintiff drove 125 feet fron1 
the stop sign on the south side of the highway into a busy 
intersection and to the point of impact at a speed of only 
5 to 6 miles per hour without looking to the east for traf-
fic which might be approaching, after leaving the stop 
south of the intersection, although he could have seen a 
distance of 368 feet when he left the stop sign and could 
have seen an even greater distance as he proceeded 
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through the intersection, evidences such a lack of "due 
care" on his part as to make him guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law. 
POINT II. 
THE VERDICT RETURNED BY THE JURY WAS IM-
PROPER ON ITS FACE AND NOIT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
T'he verdict rendered in this case was as follows: 
"We, the jury impaneled in the above entitled 
cause, find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendants jointly and severally and 
assess plaintiff's damages as follows: 
"Physical injury, pain and 
suffering ------------------------------------------$ 
Medical Expenses ----------------------------$ 214.50 
Loss of earnings during 
recuperation ------------------------------------$1,000.00 
Permanent disability --------------------$4,000.00 
Pickup truck --------------------------------------$ 565.00 
Total ____________________________ ----------------$5,779 .50" 
Plaintiff contends that it was error for the judge 
to insert a cipher after physical injury, pain and suffer-
ing, although the record does not indicate that the judge 
did so (R. 171). Plaintiff asserts that the absence of the 
cipher indicates that the jury inadvertently overlooked 
this item, while the insertion of the cipher indicates that 
the jury concluded that the plaintiff had sustained no pain 
and suffering. 
We are not so clairvoyant. We believe the verdict is 
so confusing as not to indicate what the jury intended 
to do and is, therefore, invalid. On the face of the ver-
dict the jury found that the plaintiff sustained no pain 
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and suffering. Having found that he received no physi-
cal injury or pain or suffering, they could not then find 
that he had suffered either any loss of injuries during 
recuperation or permanent disability. 
Of course, we do not contend that the plain tiff did 
not receive some physical injury. In fact, at the time 
of trial, we stipulated to the contrary. We do feel that 
the verdict is so unresponsive to the issues and so con-
fusing that it was invalid and cannot, therefore, be en-
tered. Of course this point is not involved in this appeal. 
Defendants are not appealing from the judgment and 
believe it is correct. The point becornes important only 
should this court determine to set the judgn1en t aside and 
direct entry of judgment on the verdict. At that point 
defendants would have a constitutional right of appeal 
from that judgment. We raise the point for the court's 
consideration no'v to hope that it may aid the court in 
its determination and obviate the expense of further 
litigation. 
As to the validity of the judgment, the following is 
found in 53 Am. Jur., page 729: 
"In an action in which a money judgment is 
sought, a verdict which fails to state specifically, 
or which is indefinite as to, the amount which 
the jury deems the plaintiff to be entitled to on his 
cause of action, or the amount which the defendant 
should recover in the event that the verdict nnds 
in his favor on the counterclaim or cross-conl-
plaint, or a verdict which affirmatively states 
that the party in whose favor the verd1et is ren-
dered is entitled to no amount, is not one on whieh 
a valid judgment can be entered. The principle 
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just stated is applicable to the award of no1ninal 
damages as well as compensatory darnag·es, sineP 
this term is purely relative and carries with it no 
suggestion as to amount. However, general ver-
dicts should be construed to give them effect, if 
that can be reasonably done, and it h·as been held 
in a number of cases that if by reference to the 
entire record in the case and all of the pleadings, 
or from the data found by the jury, a definite 
sum can be fixed, judgment on the verdict should 
be entered for such fixed and definite amount. 
Thus, for example, where the suit is up·on a pronl-
issory note, and the jury finds for the plaintiff, 
the amount due on the note sued upon, the court in 
such a case has sufficient data fron1 which the in-
tention of the jury can be determined." 
It has been held that a finding of actual damages is 
a necessary predicate of punitive or exemplary damages. 
See the annotations on this subject contained in 33 A.L.R. 
384, and 81' .A...L.R. 913, wherein the general rule is stated 
to be: 
"* * * That actual damages must be found as 
a p·redicate for-or, as sometimes expressed, ac-
tual damage must have been done to sustain-
an award of exemplary damages, is the rule to 
which most of the courts are committed.'' 
S.ee also the cases collected in 116 .A...L.R. 828, where-
in the following general rule is announced: 
"In an action in which a money judgment is 
sought, a verdict which fails to state specifically, 
or which is indefinite as so, the amount to which 
the jury deems the plaintiff to he entitled on his 
cause of action, or the amount wh"ich the defend-
ant should recover in the event that the verdict 
finds in his favor on his counterclaim or cross-
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complaint, or a verdict which affirmatively states 
that the party in whose favor the verdict is ren-
dered is entitled to no amount, is not one on which 
a valid judgment can be entered." 
In 20 A.L.R. (2) 276, will be found a collection of 
cases which hold that a verdict which awards the plain-
tiff the a1nount of his medical expenses vvithout simul-
taneously awarding him dan1ages for pain and suffering 
is invalid. Therein vvrill be found this statement: 
"The question discussed in this annotation 
is whether a verdict may validly award plaintiff, 
in a personal injury action, the exact amount of his 
medical expenses \vithout sin1ultaneously award-
ing hin1 dan1ages for pain and suffering where 
claim therefor was made and properly proven. 
"Th·e nu1nber of cases in which this question 
has been specifically answered is relatively small. 
But despite the dearth of authority, it seems per-
missible to state, on general principles,, that such 
a verdict is invalid, and all the cases in which this 
particular point was involved are in accord with 
this rule." 
The foregoing citation was cited in Hall v. Cornet, 
(Ore.) 240 Pac. ( 2d) 231. In that case, plaintiff brought 
an action for personal injuries sustained in an automobile 
collision which allegedly resulted fro1n the negligence 
of the defendant. The first verdict of the jury awarded 
the plaintiff $1.00 general damages and $1,066.40 special 
damages. The jury was instructed and sent back for 
further consideration. The jury then returned a verdict 
awarding $300.00 general damages and $707.40 special 
damages. The court then set aside the verdict and grant-
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ed plaintiff a new trial. The Supreme Court sustained 
the trial judge and said: 
"A verdict cannot validly award plaintiff 
in action for personal injuries allegedly caused 
through defendant's negligence, exact amount of 
his medical expenses without simultaneously 
awarding him damages for pain and suffering-
wh'en claim therefor was properly made and 
proven.'' 
The court sustained the granting of a new trial in 
that case under the following reasoning: 
"In returning that verdict, (the second ver-
dict) the jury was guilty of misconduct. The rec-
ord conclusively shows they merely juggled the 
figures which they had adopted in their first abor-
tive verdict. They simply borrowed $299.00 from 
the undisputed amount of the special dan1ages, 
as first found by them, and added that sum to the 
$1.00 which they had previously attempted to 
award as. general damages, with a resultant ver-
dict of $300.00 general damages and $707.40 spe-
cial damages. They gave no genuine consideration 
to the instruction of the trial court to award the. 
plain tiff, in the event they found liability, such 
'sum of money as would reasonably compensate 
her for such injuries and damages, pain and suf-
fering.'" 
In the case of Haydel v. Morton, 48 Pac. (2d) 709, 
(Cal.) in was held that a verdict for plaintiff in a slander 
suit which assessed compensatory damages in the sum 
of $0.00 and exemplary damages at $10,000.00 required a 
new trial. 
One might argue that the defendant was not preju-
diced by the failure of th·e jury to find any damages for 
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physical injury, pain and suffering. Such an argument 
overlooks the fact that the verdict shows on its face 
that the jury were guilty of misconduct in failing to follow 
the instruction of the court in assessing damages or that 
the instructions of the court were confusing or n1islead-
ing. It presumes that if the jury had followed the instruc-
tions of the court, or the instructions had not been mis-
leading, the jury would have returned exactly the same 
verdict except that they would have made an award for 
physical injury, pain and suffering. Such a presumption 
is not warranted. 
The Court in its Instruction No. 1 R. 212-213, in re-
viewing the claims of the plaintiff, instructed the jury 
that the action had been brought by the plaintiff to re-
cover for injuries and damage including the following. 
"A hemorrhage of the mouth, a brain injury, 
from which he has suffered partial loss of function 
of his right hand and arm and from which, such 
right hand and ar1n are still partially paralyzed, 
continuous accute headaches, impaired vision and 
accute pain and suffering. That such injuries to 
his brain are continuing and progressive and will 
require that plaintiff undergo surgical care and 
treatment ... that in addition thereto plaintiff 
has been caused to incur medical expenses which 
amounted to $2'14.50 ... which plaintiff contem-
plated would increase $2,000.00 ... and he alleges 
... he was a healthy and able bodied man and was 
capable of earning $700.00 per month, because of 
the accident he was unable to work at all for four 
months from which fact he suffered damages in 
the su~ of $2,800.00, he has suffered continuing 
impairment and disability so that he suffered a 
loss of earning power in the sum of $56,000.00,". 
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These instructions were excepted to (R. 160) upon 
the grounds that there was no evidence to substantiate 
any of these claims except the item of $214.50 medical 
exp.enses and that these issues should not be presented 
to the jury even in the form given in Instruction No. 1 
as such would tend to ·mislead and confuse the jury. The 
court repeated this error in Instruction 1'5. T'hat they 
were misleading and did confuse the jury is evidenced 
by the execessive award given for p-er1nanent injuries in 
this case. 
On the question of loss and earnings, the only evi-
dence was that Mr. Bates lost 200 turkeys after this ac-
cident during the year 19-52. However, he was only able 
to guess at this amount after the continual prodding of 
his attorney, his first answer being that he had no idea. 
He then testified that it was normal to lose more tur-
keys at this time of the year than at any other time of the 
year and that most of thes.e losses were normal, so that 
it is impossible to determine from the evidence in this 
case if Mr. Bates lost any turkeys as a result of this acci-
dent, if he did, how many, and the value of those lost. 
Of course, the following year, Mr. Bates netted $8,212.35 
as compared with $2,000.00 in the year 1952, so that if 
any conclusion can be drawn the only conclusion war-
ranted is that the accident was responsible for him mak-
ing more rather than less on the op·eration of his turkey 
farm. 
On the question of permanent disability, there was 
no ·evidence of any permanent disability other than the 
fact that the plaintiff, a sixty-nine year old man, was 
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forgetful after the accident and that he could not do the 
work after the accident that he could before although he 
admitted he could not do heavy work before the accident. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the verdict was in-
valid and judgment cannot be entered thereon, and that 
the defendant would be prejudicially affected by its 
entry. 
C·ONCLUSION 
In conclusion we can summarize the evidence and the 
reasons why plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence no better than the trial judge in his memorandum 
decision herein starting on page 17 4 of the record: 
"·The plaintiff testified that he was driving 
his truck from his turkey ranch northward on the 
Geneva Road on Oetober 9, 1952, and at about two 
o'clock P.M. came to the intersection of that road 
with Highway 91 at Pleasant Grove, where he 
stopped at the stop sign. The weather was clear 
and the pavement was dry. That the traffic was 
quite heavy, compelling him to wait four or five 
minutes before the intersection cleared sufficient-
ly for him to attempt to cross. That he was driv-
ing a 19'41 truck in low and was going 5 to 6 miles 
per hour. He was well acquainted with this inter-
section, knew it was a very busy way and had had 
to wait at times for as much as fifteen minutes for 
traffic to clear. That he saw the coal truck co1ning 
when it was 'maybe 150 feet away and coming 
fast' and 'did speed up a little right on the last' 
and got 'pret' near across but got hit.' He esti-
mated the point of impact and upon his estimate 
it was measured upon plaintiff's exhibit 'A' at 
12'5' from the stop sign where he had stopped. 
Upon cross examination he testified that he did 
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not see one Dr. Paul Christopherson who was 
traveling east upon Highway 91 and turned south 
upon the Geneva R.oad past him. Neither did he 
see Dr. Christop·erson's salutation even though 
he did see a car approaching. He couldn't tell how 
far the truck was away when he saw it, hut esti-
mated that it was between 100' and 150 away. He 
did speed up a little, saw the truck approaching 
just before the impact. The testimony now is that 
he saw the truck but doesn't know exactly how far 
away it was. He did not remember John Stewart, 
an insurance adjuster. Nor did he remen1ber 
. giving him the statement, Defendants' Exhibit 
1, or that he made the state1nent therein contained, 
to-wit: 
" 'I was about three-fourths of the way across 
the highway (two lanes) when I was hit by the 
truck or know it was near until it hit me.' 
"To this statement he wrote in his own hand: 
" 'I have read pages one, two, three and they 
are correct. Leonard Bates.' and he acknowledges 
that the signatures upon each page of the state-~ 
ment are his own. 
''He drove in a straight line from the stop 
sign the 125· feet plus or minus to the point of 
impact, making no attempt whatsoever to turn 
his truck to the left. Considering this evidence 
in its most favorable light for the plaintiff as the 
court must do up·on a motion of the sort under con-
sideration, there is still no escap·e from the conclu-
sion that after the plaintiff had p-rudently stopped 
-at the stop sign, and had prudently waited for 
some 5 or 6 minutes for traffic to clear, and pru-
dently started into the intersection after it had be-
come clear, he did not look again in either direc-
tion, at ·any rate until he had crossed the center 
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line of Highway 91 going northerly. Furthermore, 
it is inescapable that he continued his truck in low 
gear for a distance in excess of 100 feet traveling 
through an intersection which he knew to be so 
busy that he had had to wait as much as fifteen 
minutes on previous occasions for traffic to clear, 
at a speed of 5 or 6 miles per hour while he stated 
he could have traveled faster, (he said that he 
did speed up a little when he saw the truck com-
ing at him pretty fast) and if he had traveled 
faster by any appreciable degree he would have 
cleared the intersection before defendants' truck 
came within a dangerous distance. 
"As shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit 'A', a line 
drawn from the stop sign easterly past the first 
obstruction to visibility, gave him an unobstructed 
vie\v up the highway for 268 feet. Manifestly 
as he advanced into the intersection, his view ex-
tended to his right (as well as to his left). If he 
had kept a reasonable and proper lookout he could 
have seen defendants' truck for a great distance 
along the highway (considering that he was 
traveling as slowly as the evidence indicates and 
the defendant was traveling between 35 and 50 
miles per hour). Even if he had seen it was 268; 
feet away, he would still have h'ad plenty of time 
to speed up and pass in head of it or stop safely 
on the south side of the center line (even though 
ever so negligent) to pass safely in head of him. 
"If he had looked as the law required him to 
do, he would have· seen, and if he had seen he 
could have avoided the collision by the simple 
expedient of stopping, turning aside or even by 
speeding up. 
"In his failure, he was negligent as a matter 
of law and likewise, as a matter of law, his negli-
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gence proximately contributed to produce the ac-
cident and his own injury and damage. Generally, 
the authorities for this determination are so farni-
liar to both counsel that to quote them would be 
mere surplusage, except the court especially draws 
attention to the language of Martin v. Stevens, 
243 Pac. (2d) 747, under syllabus No. 7, where 
the court describing the duties of the driver with 
the right of way at an intersection says: 'Admit-
tedly the right of way is not absolute. One who 
has it under one or both of the aforen1entioned 
rules, (entering the intersection upon his right 
of way because he entered first, when to do so 
would hazard a collision and that giving right of 
way to the right hand of two vehicles entering the 
intersection at the same time). may not, with fool-
hardy assurance, claim the right of way in face of 
danger which one exercising due care would see 
and avoid. Although plaintiff (as here) had the 
right of way under both rules above referred to, 
yet there .dev-eloped upon him the duty of d'ue ca.re 
in observmg for other traffic. But in doing so, he. 
had the right to assume, amd to rely a(Ji;,d act on 
the ~assumption that others would do likewise; he 
was not obli.qate:dl to an.ticip~ate either that the 
other W'Ould drive negligently, nor fail to accord 
him his right of way, until in the exercise of due 
care, he observed., or should have observed, some--
thing to warn him that the other driver w·as driv-
ing negligently or would fail to accord him his 
right of way.' " (Italics. added.) 
The entry of the verdict in this case was erroneous. 
Not for the reasons set forth by the plaintiff. The reasons 
being that a finding of p-ermanent damage and loss of 
earnings during recuperation must be predicated upon 
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a finding of physical injury, pain and suffering. And for 
the additional reason that the evidence does not sustain 
the amount awarded for loss of earnings or permanent 
disability and these issues should not have been submit-
ted to the jury. Of course, this point is immaterial should 
this court determine that the trial judge was correct in 
the granting of the motion to set aside the verdict. It 
becomes important only if the court should reverse the 
trial judge, in which event, it is respectfully submitted, 
this court would have no alternative but to grant a new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STE:W ART, CANNON & HAN'S'ON 
D·ON J. HANSO·N 
Attorneys for Defe~Wdoots arnd 
Respondents 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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